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Congressional Standing to Litigate War
Powers Resolution Claims
I. INTRODUCTION
Two hundred years of history under the Constitution has argua-
bly demonstrated the workability of two fundamental principles: (1)
separation of powers; and (2) checks and balances.' The Framers of
the Constitution knew that the success and survival of the govern-
ment they were forming depended on a certain amount of agreement
between the executive, legislative and judicial branches. However, the
"separation of powers" and "checks and balances" scheme upon
which this government is predicated inevitably fosters struggle over
various policy matters. Nowhere is this conflict more apparent than
in the context of which branch will ultimately control United States
foreign policy.2 This is particularly true in the realm of the "war
powers." 3
The objective of this article is threefold. First, the article will
discuss the evolution of the "war powers" from its inception under
the Constitution to the present day, including its most recent embodi-
ment under the controversial War Powers Resolution.4 Second, the
analysis will focus on whether War Powers Resolution claims are jus-
ticiable; in other words, whether judicial review over the war-making
power is permitted. Finally, the question of justiciability leads to a
discussion of the still controversial notion of whether a member of
Congress has standing to litigate War Powers Resolution claims.5
Throughout this article, it should be recognized that the issues dis-
cussed have direct impact on international law via the United States'
handling of its foreign policy.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF WAR POWERS
The "original intent" of the Framers of our Constitution was to
1. Although the Constitution has undergone various changes in form as well as sub-
stance, these two principles which represented liberty to the framers have endured. See, e.g.,
THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 10 (J. Madison); 28 (A. Hamilton); 41 (J. Madison); 47 (J. Madison);
and 51 (J. Madison).
2. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 200 (1940).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
4. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1973).
5. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150-54 (1988).
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vest primary control over war powers with the most representative
branch of government: Congress.6 The accepted reason for entrusting
Congress with such control was a general belief that the executive
branch would have a proclivity towards war-making. For example, in
a letter to Thomas Jefferson, James Madison expressed such an opin-
ion stating that "[tihe constitution supposes, what the History of all
Govts demonstrates, that the Ex[ecutive] is the branch of power most
interested in war, & most prone to it. It [Congress] has accordingly
with studied care, vested the question of war in the Legisl[ature]."7
Specifically, the allocation of war making power which Madison
spoke of can be found in article I, section 8, clause 11 of the Constitu-
tion, which provides Congress with the power "[t]o declare War,
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water."'8 This power, albeit vested in the most
representative branch, ironically caused some concern that Congress
was quickly becoming an oligarchy. Whether or not a common per-
ception, this concern was prevalent enough to warrant a response
from Alexander Hamilton. In discussing the significant restraints
placed on the legislative branch, Hamilton emphasized:
[T]hat the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the Legisla-
ture, not in the Executive; that this legislature was to be a popular
body, consisting of the representatives of the people periodically
elected; and that ... there was to be found.., an important qualifi-
cation even of the legislative discretion, in that clause which for-
bids the appropriation of money for the support of an army for any
longer period than two years-a precaution which, upon a nearer
view of it, will appear to be a great and real security against keep-
6. The Framers believed that the essence of liberty derived from a republican form of
government where the most representative branch would have the responsibility for the initia-
tion of war. This would ensure that the government was acting in accordance with the peo-
ple's will before the nation entered into any war. In distinguishing the predominant authority
of Congress vis-a-vis the executive authority in the separation of powers scheme, Alexander
Hamilton said:
The President is to be the commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United
States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the
king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to
nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval
forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy; while that of the British king
extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies-
all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature
[Congress].
THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 446 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1966).
7. Letter from Madison to Jefferson (April 2, 1778), reprinted in 6 MADISON, WRITINGS
312-13 (G. Hunt ed. 1906).
8. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
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ing up of troops without evident necessity.9
As a further restraint, the Constitution required joint or bicam-
eral affirmative action before war could be waged, ostensibly a limita-
tion designed to ensure wars with only broad grassroots support.'0 On
the other hand, the executive branch was vested with the power of
"Commander-in-Chief." I l Although this clause is susceptible to dif-
ferent interpretations, the scope of authority seems to be that it ex-
tends to supervision of the wars authorized and/or declared by
Congress. For although the President was to be the "first General
and Admiral,"' 2 the President was not vested with the power to initi-
ate wars or unilaterally deploy armed forces.13 Despite the Framers'
efforts to the contrary, the control over the war power began to incre-
mentally shift from the legislative branch to the executive branch.
14
Subtly developed modem theories such as "interposition" and
"intervention" to explain military action gradually facilitated the ex-
ecutive branches' encroachment on congressional war-making author-
ity. 15 This significant expansion of Presidential war-making authority
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 24, at 204 (A. Hamilton) (J. Pole. ed. 1987). For discussion of
how the appropriation limitation is being circumvented, see Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Nat'l Security Policy & Scientific Developments of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1970).
10. J. ROGERS, WAR POLICING AND THE CONSTITUTION 34 n.21 (1945). During the
ratification process, Framer James Wilson made this comment to the Pennsylvania convention:
This system will not bring us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not
be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress;
for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large.., from
this circumstance we may draw a certain conclusion that nothing but our national
interest can draw us into war.
2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOVTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 528 (J. Elliot ed. 1888) (emphasis added).
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
12. THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (J. Pole ed. 1987). The Framers
substituted the word "declare" for "make" in the Constitution's granting of war powers to
Congress in order to allow an exception (according to Madison) which left the Executive with
"the power to repel sudden attacks" on the United States. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1789 318-19 (M. Farrand ed. 1966).
13. Id.
14. Countless scholars have attributed this significant shift to many things including con-
gressional acquiescence and complacency as well as presidential prerogative and usurpation.
See, e.g., E. KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR (1982); Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Consti-
tutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, 55 VA. L. REV. 1243 (1969); Ides, Congress, Constitutional
Responsibility and the War Power, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 599 (1984); Ratner & Cole, The Force
of Law: Judicial Enforcement of the War Powers Resolution, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 715 (1984).
15. See DEPT. OF STATE, THE RIGHT TO PROTECT CITIZENS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
By LANDING FORCES (3d ed. 1933). J. Reuben Clark, the solicitor of the State Department,
proposed in 1912 a distinction between "interposition" and "intervention." Id.
1989]
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predictably led to various military deployments without any congres-
sional authorization.' 6
As a consequence, the United States' military involvement in Ko-
rea set a precedent as the first time in history that the executive
branch claimed the broad power to begin a war without congressional
approval.' 7 To justify his action, President Truman stated that the
military involvement was necessary in order to protect the "interest of
American foreign policy." 18 Although not without controversy, 19 the
military deployment in Korea was conducted, for the most part, with
Congress out of the picture.20 Therefore, the Truman Administration
Interposition meant simply the limited insertion of troops to protect lives and prop-
erty; it implied neutrality toward the government or toward the contesting forces
within the country; and, since it was a normal exercise of international law, it did
not, Clark argued, require Congressional approval. The power to interpose he de-
rived from the President's executive power; nothing special was claimed for the Pres-
ident in his role as Commander in Chief. Intervention, on the other hand, meant
interference in sovereign affairs; it implied an act of war and required congressional
authorization.
A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 89-90 (1973).
16. Id. at 88-91. See also 2 H. PRINGLE, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF WILLIAM HOWARD
TAFT 678-99 (1939); P. CARTER, CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC REACTION To WILSON'S
CARIBBEAN POLICY 1913-1917 (1977). It is also interesting to note the comment of then-
Congressman Abraham Lincoln who stated in a letter to William Herndon with regards to the
Mexican War, "[a]Uow the President to invade a neighboring nation, whenever 'he' shall deem
it necessary to repel an invasion.., and you allow him to make war at pleasure. Study to see if
you can fix 'any limit' to his power in this respect ...... 1 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 451 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
17. Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea, 23 Dep't St. Bull. 173 passim
(1950) (quoted in Friedman, Waging War Against Checks and Balances-The Claim of an
Unlimited Presidential War Power, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 213, 232 n.57 (1983)). "[T]his claim
of presidential power was without precedent in American history." Id. at 233.
18. President Truman committed United States troops in Korea on the theory that "the
President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, has full control
over the use thereof." 23 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 173 (1950). Truman's Secretary of State, Dean
Acheson, articulated the Administration's vision that:
Not only has the President the authority to use the Armed Forces in carrying out the
broad foreign policy of the United States and implementing treaties, but it is equally
clear that this authority may not be interfered with by the Congress in the exercise of
powers which it has under the Constitution.
Assignment of Ground Forces in European Area: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations & Armed Services, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 92 (1951) (Statement of Dean Acheson, Sec-
retary of State).
19. Senator Robert Taft made the observation that "[t]he President simply usurped au-
thority, in violation of the laws and the Constitution, when he sent troops to Korea to carry
out the resolution of the United Nations in an undeclared war." 97 CONG. REC. 57 (1951).
20. This is reflected in a remark by Frederic R. Coudert, Jr., a conservative congressman
from New York, who said, "how devastating a precedent [we] have set in remaining silent
while the President took over the powers specifically reserved for Congress in the Constitu-
tion." A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 15, at 135.
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obtained the distinction of engineering the first undeclared war in
United States history.21 It is also important to note that during this
time, no litigation was ever initiated by anyone to challenge this rela-
tively novel notion of presidential prerogative.
22
This newly-fashioned presidential prerogative was next exercised
by President Nixon in Vietnam and a second undeclared war became
a reality. However, the difference between the United States' military
involvement in Vietnam as opposed to Korea was the degree of con-
gressional complicity and deference to the executive branch in con-
ducting the wars. 23 As noted earlier, Congress was conspicuously
uninvolved with the conflict in Korea.24 In Vietnam, on the other
hand, Congress abdicated its responsibility over the war powers
through passage of the infamous Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. 25
Despite the fact that this Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave the
President unbridled authority, in particular, the free reins to make
war, 26 few heeded the wisdom of the Constitution's framers in expres-
sing doubt that the President would use it.27 That such carte blanche
21. Supra note 18. Obviously, one of the difficulties is in differing interpretations of what
constitutes a "war."
22. This is qualified as a "relatively new notion" because the exercise of "presidential
prerogative" in a military situation is not completely unprecedented. Cf The Prize Cases, 7
U.S. (3 Wall.) 514 (1865). It should also be noted that litigation was brought to challenge the
executive branch's authority to seize property to further international military policy. See
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
23. Technically, President Nixon inherited the Vietnam conflict since military advisers
had been present in Cambodia as early as President Eisenhower's Administration. However,
the military buildup dramatically increased during Nixon's presidency.
24. See A. SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 15, at 133.
25. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution provided:
Sec. 1. That Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as
Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack
against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.
Sec.2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace
the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant
with the Constitution and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with
its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States
is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, in-
cluding the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the South-
east Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, §§ 1-2, 78 Stat. 384 (1964).
26. Supporters of the Resolution included Senators Fulbright, Cooper and Javits. 110
CONG. REC. 18,403-04, 18,409 (1964) (statement of Sen. Fulbright); Id. at 18,409-10 (state-
ment of Sen. Cooper) Id. at 18,418 (statement of Sen. Javits).
27. Only two senators, Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon and Senator Greening of Alaska
voted against the resolution. Both were subsequently defeated in their re-election campaigns.
Senator Wayne Morse expressed his dissent in saying:
I believe that history will record that we have made a great mistake by subverting
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. LJ [Vol. 11:613
delegation of authority would occur is not as surprising as the cavalier
manner in which Congress hastily passed the measure without reflec-
tion upon the constitutional implications. 28 Despite later congres-
sional efforts to reclaim what had been given to the executive branch
willy-nilly, 29 the political momentum remained within the bounds of
presidential prerogative for the remainder of the conflict.
Undoubtedly, the combined experiences of Korea and Vietnam
served as the prelude to passage of the War Powers Resolution.
30
There had been a constitutional breakdown in the war powers sphere.
Now, through various hearings on war-making authority, Congress
attempted to regain its rightful (constitutional) legacy. 31 The result
was a bipartisan effort to legislatively recoup what was already clearly
expressed and sufficiently articulated in the Constitution. That such
legislation was deemed necessary can be construed as tacit acknowl-
edgment of past congressional impotence when confronted with a re-
calcitrant executive branch. In any case, Congress seemed to believe
and circumventing the Constitution of the United States... by means of this resolu-
tion. As I argued earlier today at some length, we are in effect giving the President
... warmaking powers in the absence of a declaration of war. I believe this to be a
historic mistake.
110 CONG. REC. 18,470 (1964).
28. The House of Representatives adopted the Resolution by a vote of 416 to 0 after time
in the committee and the floor amounted to eighty minutes. The Senate passed the Resolution
by a vote of eight-eight to two after approximately eight and a half hours of debate. Staff of
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); THE WAR POWERS RESOLU-
TION: A SPECIAL STUDY OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 4-5 (Comm. Print 1982)
(hereinafter SPECIAL STUDY).
29. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued what can be characterized as a re-
morseful report when it stated:
The Gulf of Tonkin resolution represents the extreme point in the process of consti-
tutional erosion that began in the first years of this century. Couched in broad terms,
the resolution constitutes an acknowledgment of virtually unlimited Presidential con-
trol of the armed forces. It is of more than historical importance that the Congress
now ask itself why it was prepared to acquiesce in the transfer to the executive of a
power which, beyond any doubt, was intended by the Constitution to be exercised by
Congress.
S. REP. No. 797, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1967).
Repeal of the Resolution was symbolic at best with little practical effect since the Nixon
administration had disavowed any reliance on the resolution for its military excursions. Act of
Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053, 2055 (1971). The Nixon administration
relied on the Commander-in-Chief power to supervise troop deployment for the protection of
troops already in the field. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 28, at 37, 41.
30. The reality of such experiences were indicative of the executive branch's expansion in
the area of war powers.
31. Various legislative proposals were being discussed at this time with regards to the
overall division of war powers and authority. See Congress, The President, and the War Pow-
ers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on National Security Policy & Scientific Developments of the
House Comm on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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that the War Powers Resolution would bolster its position in getting
the executive branch to recede or relinquish the war-making authority
granted to it by default.3 2 Therefore, in 1973, and over the veto of
President Nixon, Congress adopted the War Powers Resolution.
33
For many members of Congress and the public in general, it symbol-
ized the restoration of the respective rights and responsibilities be-
tween the executive and legislative branches in every decision to
commit United States troops.
34
III. THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
Three sections are considered to be the major substantive provi-
sions of the War Powers Resolution.35 For example, section 3 re-
quires, in pertinent part, that "[tihe President in every possible
instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent in-
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. ' 36
Section 4 is a reporting requirement which is considered by some
to be "the essential element of the War Powers Resolution. ' ' 37 In
specified deployment of United States Armed Forces,
38
[T]he President shall submit within 48 hours [a written report to
both Houses] ... setting forth: (A) the circumstances necessitating
the introduction of United States Armed Forces; (B) the constitu-
tional and legislative authority under which such introduction took
place; and (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or
involvement.39
32. Id.
33. The War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1973).
34. See Zablocki, War Powers Resolution: Its Past Record And Future Promise, 17 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 579, 597-98 (1984). Representative Zablocki was chairman of the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, and co-author of the War Powers Resolution.
35. The War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1973).
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. Zablocki, supra note 34, at 581.
38. Section 4(a) specifies that:
In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United States Armed
Forces are introduced
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for
combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or
training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped
for combat already located in a foreign nation;
The War Powers Resolution of 1973, § 4, 50 U.S.C. § 1543 (1973).
39. Id. (emphasis added).
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A reasonable construction of the emphasized portion seems to be that
it requires affirmative action and disallows executive discretion. How-
ever, the numerous instances of executive noncompliance (without
uniform congressional disapprobation) has made it otherwise.
40
This problem of executive noncompliance can be traced to the
executive branch's use of the "Commander-in-Chief" power which
has perpetuated the myth of its constitutional importance. 4' As one
of the resolution's drafters stated, "[tihe notion that the President can
decide whether or not to seek congressional approval for committing
troops is not evident in the Constitution or in the statements of the
founding fathers. The fact that executive branch lawyers say there is
such evidence does not give it constitutional foundation. ' 42 Never-
theless, the executive branch's noncompliant attitude has persisted,
thereby frustrating the development of any collective judgment be-
tween Congress and the President on whether or not to commit
troops to hostilities.
43
The third major provision is section 5 which requires that the
President withdraw any armed forces located in hostile zones within
sixty calendar days "unless the Congress (1) has declared war or has
enacted a specific authorization for such use of United States Armed
Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3) is physi-
cally unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United
States.""4 The glaring defect of such a provision is that it politically
legitimizes or, at a minimum, condones executive encroachment on
the war powers through unilateral troop deployment, and relegates
40. See generally, Zablocki, supra note 34.
41. Id. at 581.
42. Id. However, Rep. Zablocki seems to make an unwitting, or at least, unnecessary
concession when explaining this provision. He would have been better disposed to substitute
"when" in place of "if" when he said, "If the President files a report under the first circum-
stance .... " Id. at 581. If this is indicative of the collective state of mind of Congress, then
the unlimited Presidential prerogative heretofore witnessed has been left undisturbed and Con-
gress is left in its reactive posture.
43. Id. at 582. Another deficiency worth noting is the fact that several terms in the con-
sultation requirement are not defined. "Neither the key terms, 'consult,' and 'hostilities,' nor
the phrase, 'in every possible instance,' are defined, leaving the application of this provision to
the vagaries of political circumstance and presidential creativity. The decisions of whether and
to what extent consultation is required are to be made by the President." Ides, supra note 14,
at 627.
44. The War Powers Resolution of 1973, § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1544 (1973). Section 5(b)
also has a thirty day extension provision following executive certification "that unavoidable
military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the continued
use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces." Id.
620 [Vol. 11:613
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Congress to a reactive posture or knee-jerk position. 45 In practical
terms, this means that the President can deploy troops on his own
without any congressional involvement until after the fact. Unfortu-
nately, this fundamentally deviates from the stated purpose of the
Resolution:
The purpose of the War Powers Resolution is, in its own terms, to
fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United
States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress
and the President will apply to the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,
and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such
situations.
46
In practical effect, the Resolution has delegated "short-term" 47
war-making power to the President since it is unlikely that Congress
will terminate the military action of already-engaged forces prior to
expiration of the sixty (or ninety) day period.48 Under such condi-
tions, Congress would be left with little choice but to ratify the execu-
tive's initiative. 49 With this scenario in mind, there were some who
voiced concern that this Resolution would not reinvigorate congres-
sional involvement in the war powers decision-making context that
others envisioned and hoped for. 50 On the other hand, the Resolution
45. "The composite message from the War Powers Resolution is that the President has
an open ended authorization from Congress to insert United States military forces into hostili-
ties whenever he deems it sound to do so. He should consult; he must report; but in all events
the decision to engage in military action is in his hands." Ides, supra note 14, at 630.
46. The War Powers Resolution of 1973, § 2, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1973) (emphasis added).
47. The military invasion of Grenada is a case in point.
48. Although section 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution states that "such forces shall be
removed by the President if the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution," this is probably
invalid following the decision of INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Section 5(c) only re-
quires a majority vote of Congress and does not require presentment to the executive. The
War Powers Resolution of 1973, § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. § 1549 (1973). This circumvents the polit-
ical process which is forbidden under Chadha.
49. L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 236.
50. Senator Abourezk stated the Resolution was "a blank check which will implicate
Congress in whatever aggressive war-making a President judges to be necessary." 119 CONG.
REC. 25052-53 (1973). Likewise, Senator Fulbright condemned the Resolution's "de facto
grant of expanded Presidential authority" and rejected such codification believing the better
alternative was to leave the executive without any notice of congressional posture. "A prudent
and conscientious President, under those circumstances, would hesitate to take action that he
did not feel confident he could defend to Congress. He would remain accountable to Congress
for his action to a greater extent than he would if he had specific authorizing language to fall
back upon. Congress, for its part, would retain its uncompromised right to pass judgment
upon any military initiative taken without its advance approval." Id. at 25095.
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makes it less likely that the United States will become militarily in-
volved in any foreign country for an extended period of time without
the express sanction of Congress.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL STANDING
The War Powers Resolution was Congress' attempt at a constitu-
tional comeback in foreign affairs, and specifically, in the partnership
of war-making authority. Therefore, when a situation arises in which
there is executive noncompliance with the War Powers Resolution as
well as a non-vigilant Congress vis-a-vis the Resolution's provisions, it
should not surprise anyone that such a political impasse is eventually
brought to the judicial forum. In fact, the American public witnessed
several judicial challenges to the legality of the war effort in Vietnam
by a broad spectrum of citizens, taxpayers, draftees, and members of
Congress.51 In most of these cases, the federal courts refused to adju-
dicate challenges to presidential war-making. 52 However, these cases
arose prior to Congress passing the War Powers Resolution. There-
fore, any litigant challenging military deployment by the executive
now has statutory as well as constitutional authority.
In order to get through the courtroom door, a litigant must have
"standing" to bring the suit. The concept of "standing" derives from
the self-imposed limitation on judicial power which is expressed by
the "case or controversy" clause of article III of the Constitution.
53
In Sierra Club v. Morton,5 4 the United States Supreme Court stated
51. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Holtzman v. Schlesinger,
484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451
F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971); Orlando v. Laird, 443
F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub norL; Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 1042 (1970); Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
945 (1967); Davi v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Va. 1970); United States v. Sisson, 294 F.
Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968); Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968), aff'd sub
nom..
52. A notable and short-lived exception was the case of Holtzman v. Richardson, 361 F.
Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), in which Judge Judd enjoined the bombing of Cambodia because
it was unauthorized by Congress. Judge Judd found that the Executive had ignored limits
imposed by Congress in its expansion of the war effort in Cambodia. This decision was re-
versed by the Second Circuit based on the finding that the process in which the Executive
winds down the war is a non-justiciable political question. Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d
1307, 1311 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
53. The primary focus of standing is "on the party seeking to get his complaint before a
federal court" and only secondarily "on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated." Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (emphasis added). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 107.
54. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
[Vol. 11:613
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that the requirement of standing entailed:
Whether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable
controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy is
what has been traditionally referred to as the question of standing
to sue. Where the party does not rely on any specific statute au-
thorizing invocation of the judicial process, the question of stand-
ing depends upon whether the party has alleged such a 'personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy,' Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204, as to ensure that 'the dispute sought to be adjudicated
will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of judicial resolution.' Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 101. 55
While still controversial, there appears to be two classes of plain-
tiffs who have standing to litigate War Powers Resolution claims.
56
Until the United States Supreme Court rules otherwise, congressional
members can cite the District of Columbia Circuit Court decision in
Kennedy v. Sampson57 ("Sampson") as their authority for standing
and being able to litigate claims in general. 58 In Sampson, Senator
Edward Kennedy was not authorized to bring the suit on behalf of the
Senate or Congress. 59 Instead, he claimed alternative theories of
standing including, "his capacity as a citizen, as a taxpayer, and as a
member of the United States Senate." 6
Significantly, the appellate court agreed with the district court
that it was in Kennedy's "capacity as an individual United States Sen-
ator who voted in favor of S.3418 [The Family Practice of Medicine
55. Id. at 731.
56. The United States Supreme Court has never directly addressed the subject of legisla-
tor standing, the alleged first class of plaintiffs. L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 150. This has left
the courts divided on the issue. The second class for standing purposes is military personnel
who refuse to participate in military excursions which they believe are in violation of the War
Powers Resolution. See, e.g., Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom.
Orlando v. Laird, 404 U.S. 869 (1971). Congressional members can argue they have standing
under the authority of Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
57. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
58. Note that legislators can possibly have standing on their own behalf or in a represen-
tative capacity. See L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 145.
59. Senator Kennedy brought suit for a declaratory judgment that the Family Practice of
Medicine Act became law following its overwhelming passage in both House and Senate, even
though the President had not signed the Act. At the expiration of the ten-day period, it had
been in the possession of the executive branch. The legal question involved "the validity of
executive action which purports to have disapproved an Act of Congress by means of a consti-
tutional procedure [an executive pocket veto] which does not permit Congress to override the
disapproval." Sampson, 511 F.2d at 432.
60. Id. at 433.
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Act] ' 61 that was determinative, and did not consider the alternative
theories. Therefore, irrespective of any concurrence or nonconcur-
rence of other members who voted for the legislation, an individual
legislator has standing to protect the effectiveness of his or her own
vote. Another way of viewing this is that whenever the role of Con-
gress is diminished by executive action or a particular vote of Con-
gress has been effectively nullified, individual members of Congress
have standing to litigate the matter.
6 2
In reaching this conclusion, the Sampson court recognized that
more than one approach in evaluating standing existed. 63 Neverthe-
less, this court used the test from Flast v. Cohen,64 which required a
determination of whether a "logical nexus" existed between Ken-
nedy's status as a Senator and the claim he sought to be adjudicated.
65
To answer this, the Sampson court was forced to analyze the validity
of an executive pocket veto.66 The veto had the effect of preventing
Congress from having the opportunity to override such a veto in con-
travention of the political process as set forth in the Constitution.67
The court's analysis demonstrated that a "logical nexus" was present
between Senator Kennedy and his claim in that the purported pocket
veto had unconstitutionally nullified his vote in favor of particular
legislation.6
Notably, the Sampson court also discussed a different analysis of
standing which was employed in Association of Data Processing Ser-
vice Organization v. Camp 69 ("Camp"). In Camp, the United States
Supreme Court dealt with the question of standing by formulating a
two-prong test.70 The first prong requires a plaintiff to allege that the
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968).
65. Sampson, 511 F.2d at 433.
66. Id. If the court accepted this executive action as valid, then Senator Kennedy's vote
would be nullified and he would have "no right to demand or participate in a vote to override
the President's veto." Id. On the other hand, if Kennedy's "interpretation of the veto clause
[was] correct, then the bill became law without the President's signature." Id.
67. In order for the political process to be legitimate as well as constitutional, all legisla-
tion must comply with the provisions of bicameralism and presentment. INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983).
68. Sampson, 511 F.2d at 433.
69. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
70. Id. at 152-53.
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challenged action has caused him or her "injury in fact. ' '7' The sec-
ond prong requires a determination of whether the violated interest is
within the "zone of interests" that should be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.
72
Senator Kennedy satisfied the first prong of this test in his plead-
ing by alleging that the pocket veto had injured him by denying him
the effectiveness of his vote as a United States Senator.7 3 To satisfy
the second prong, Senator Kennedy argued that his interest was pro-
tected by the constitutional guarantee found in article I, section 7.74
This particular constitutional provision is traditionally invoked when-
ever there is a perceived intrusion or encroachment upon the allo-
cated power or prerogative of one branch by another.
7 5
The defendants countered this argument by relying upon Cole-
man v. Miller.76 They argued that Senator Kennedy's injury was de-
rivative in nature and, therefore, only the Senate or Congress as a
whole could file suit in this case since Senator Kennedy's single vote
was not the legal or political equivalent of passage of a bill. 7
7
However, the court found this reasoning unhelpful since what is
pertinent and a prerequisite to qualifying for standing is only that a
party be among the injured. 78 As established in Sierra Club v. Mor-
ton,7 9 it is not necessary that a plaintiff be the most grievously or even
the most directly injured.80
Although the Coleman v. Miller opinion did not deal with the
question of whether one of the legislator plaintiffs could have main-
tained the suit alone, the Court believed that "[iln light of the purpose
of the standing requirement.., the better reasoned view of both Cole-
man and the present case is that an individual legislator has standing
to protect the effectiveness of his vote with or without the concur-
71. This injury can be "economic or otherwise." Sampson, 511 F.2d at 433 (citing Camp,
397 U.S. at 152-53).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 433-34.
74. Id. U.S. CONST art. I, § 7 is one of several provisions surrounding the "separation of
powers" doctrine which allocate the powers and prerogatives to each governmental branch.
The court stated that Kennedy's "asserted interest plainly falls among those contemplated by
the constitutional provision [art. I, § 7] upon which he relies." Sampson, 551 F.2d at 433.
75. Id.
76. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
77. Sampson, 511 F.2d at 435.
78. Id.
79. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
80. Sampson, 511 F.2d at 435 (statement of the Sampson court in interpreting "among
the injured" in Sierra Club).
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rence of other members of the majority." ' Additionally, while the
court agreed with the proposition that Senator Kennedy's vote in the
legislative process was not the functional equivalent to passage of the
bill, nevertheless, every legislator participates in the overall power of
Congress when that individual votes in favor or against proposed leg-
islation.82 According to the court, a legislator could not assert a more
essential interest.
8 3
A different analysis was conducted by the court in Riegle v. Fed.
Open Market Comm.8 4 This court considered the question of whether
a United States Senator had standing to challenge the constitutional-
ity of certain procedures which were established by the Federal Re-
serve Act.8 5 Senator Riegle alleged that he suffered injury as a result
of his inability to exercise his right under the appointments clause of
the Constitution.
8 6
In performing its analysis, the Riegle court acknowledged that its
prior opinions contained two contradictory principles with regard to
congressional plaintiffs and standing. 87 In some of its cases, the court
had suggested that no distinctions should be made between congres-
sional plaintiffs and private plaintiffs when conducting a standing
analysis.88 On the other hand, the court had utilized a special stan-
dard in congressional plaintiff cases because of its concern over inter-
fering in the legislative process.8 9 Standing would be withheld from
congressional plaintiffs whenever the court determined that an alter-
native remedy was available.90 Stated simply, this remedy consisted
in the recognition that, in most instances, congressional plaintiffs
could introduce legislation to cure the alleged injury.91 The confusion
81. Id.
82. Id. at 435-36.
83. Id. at 436.
84. 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
85. Id. at 874.
86. Id. at 877.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (1977). "[T]here are no special standards
for determining Congressional standing questions." Id. at 204.
89. See, e.g., Ruess v. Balles, 73 F.R.D. 90 (D.D.C. 1976) (Parker, J.), aff'd, 584 F.2d
461 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). "When congressional plaintiffs have sought
to accomplish in this court what they were unable to persuade their colleagues to do, we have
usually refused to confer standing because of our concern for non-interference in the legislative
process." Riegle v. Fed. Open Market Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
90. "[T]he principle that a legislator must lack collegial or 'in-house' remedies before this
court will confer standing has been a theme of our congressional plaintiff opinions." Id. at
879.
91. Id. at 879-90. But see, Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974) and
626 [Vol. 11:613
War Powers Resolution
engendered by having such a double standard was compounded by
this court's inconsistent application of the "collegial" remedy.
92
The Riegle court's solution was to retain both standards but to
separate the collegial remedy from the standing analysis. 93 Conse-
quently, Senator Riegle acquired standing under the traditional stand-
ing analysis.94 However, the court dismissed his case based on the
belief that judicial action would improperly interfere and circumvent
the legislative process.9 5 The problem with this strict judicial re-
straint is that it conceivably forecloses all suits by congressional
plaintiffs.
96
V. JUSTICIABILITY: FROM JUDICIAL ABDICATION
TO JUDICIAL REMEDY
The Vietnam War experience generated an ongoing discussion
regarding the concepts of justiciability in general and the political
question doctrine in particular. 97 Traditionally, legal scholars have
viewed the political question doctrine as one of the ways a court can
avoid issues by methods of nondecision and predictable deference to
another branch's judgment. 98 An expression of the classical view of
this doctrine is as follows:
I submit that ... the only proper judgment that may lead to an
abstention from decision is that the Constitution has committed
the determination of the issue to another agency of government
than the courts. Difficult as it may be to make that judgment
wisely, whatever factors may be rightly weighed in situations
Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.).
The circuit court held the disenfranchisement of a senator, when a President attempted to
unilaterally terminate a treaty without the consent of the Senate, was sufficient injury for
standing purposes. The Court ignored the standing issue altogether and vacated on the basis
that plaintiffs did not pose a justiciable question.
92. Congressional plaintiffs were granted standing despite availability of the collegial
remedy in Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1974), and in Goldwater v.
Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 701-03 (D.C.Cir.), vacated, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
93. Riegle, 656 F.2d at 881.
94. Id. at 879.
95. Id. at 882.
96. The court seems to trade one approach it deems inconsistent with another inconsis-
tent approach called "circumscribed equitable discretion." Id. at 881. While the court nar-
rows the parameters of the courtroom door to make it difficult for congressional plaintiffs to
get in, it also readily admits that the same suit could be brought by a private plaintiff in most
cases anyway. Id. This court did not even deal with the possibility of a congressional plaintiff
having standing in a representative capacity. See L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 150-54.
97. See F. WORMUTH & E. FIRMAGE, To CHAIN THE DoG OF WAR 229 (1986).
98. Id.
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where the answer is not clear, what is involved is in itself an act of
constitutional interpretation, to be made and judged by standards
that should govern the interpretation process generally. That, I
submit is toto caelo different from a broad discretion to abstain or
intervene.99
This classical view can be contrasted with another view that
might be characterized as the "pragmatic" view.1°° The pragmatic
view is broad in that it encompasses prudential considerations such as
lack of judicially manageable standards, insufficient information due
to lack of fact-finding resources, and the reality that a judgment might
go unenforced.' 0
In Baker v. Carr,10 2 the political question doctrine received its
best known formulation with regards to the question of jus-
ticiability. 10 3 While focusing on the spirit of the separation of powers,
Justice Brennan identified six factors as relevant for consideration:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determina-
tion of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility
of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifari-
ous pronouncements by various departments on one question.'0 4
Undoubtedly, the most common application of the political ques-
tion doctrine occurs when litigation involves foreign affairs.105 While
Justice Brennan stated the Court will often decide such cases, he also
suggested factors which lead to a deferential posture to the political
branches.°6 In fact, subsequent Court decisions have indicated that
the first factor, a clear delineation in the Constitution which commit-
99. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 9
(1959).
100. F. WORMUTH & E. FIRMAGE, supra note 97, at 230.
101. Id. Professor Alexander Bickel has offered what is described as a "normative" view.
This theory has not achieved much acceptance. Id.
102. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. F. WORMUTH & E. FIRMAGE, supra note 97, at 232.
106. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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ted the issue to one of the political branches, is the critical one.10
7
With Vietnam as a backdrop, a few legal scholars began to ques-
tion whether complete abstention from adjudicating such cases was
justified. 0 8 Further, while most courts continued to balk at deciding
cases related to foreign affairs and the war powers, a few began to
address the merits as being within the realm of judicial competence.10 9
When the United States Supreme Court heard such cases, it ex-
hibited a preponderant deference to the political branches. This has
particularly been the case when it appeared that Congress and the
executive branch were in agreement on the issue in question." 10 Kore-
matsu v. United States " ' I is a tragic example of a case where the Court
was unwilling to second-guess the political branches who were in ac-
cord on the relocation of Japanese-Americans to concentration
camps. "12
On the other hand, Duncan v. Kahanamoku "3 demonstrates that
the Court is less likely to defer judgment when the political branches
have failed to act in unison.' ' 4 With regard to a war powers issue, the
Court should appropriately uphold congressional authority over in-
consistent executive action based on the textually demonstrable con-
stitutional grant of war powers to Congress." 5  The hostilities in
Korea gave rise to a case which is illustrative of this point. In 1952,
President Truman issued an executive order to seize the nation's steel
mills in order to avoid work stoppage.'1 6 However, the Court rejected
107. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
108. See Tigar, Judicial Power, the Political Question Doctrine and Foreign Relations, 17
UCLA L. REV. 1135 (1970); Henkin, Is There. a 'Political Question' Doctrine?, 50 YALE L.J.
597 (1976); Henkin, Vietnam in the Courts of the United States: Political Questions, 63 AM. J.
INT'L L. 284 (1969).
109. The main problem with such cases during the Vietnam era was that such cases came
too few and too late.
110. Firmage, The War Powers and the Political Question Doctrine, 49 U. COLO. L. REV.
80-89 (1977).
111. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
112. Despite the fact that this congressional action utilized a normally forbidden racial
standard for classification, the Court condoned the action by commenting, "when under condi-
tions of modem warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must
be commensurate with the threatened danger." Id. at 220. Cf. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2 (1866) and Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946), where the Court intervened
to enjoin the exercise of post-war powers which were inconsistent with civil liberties.
113. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
114. F. WORMUTH & E. FIRMAGE, supra note 97, at 237.
115. It is generally accepted that judicial resolution of such an interbranch controversy is
appropriate. See L. TRIBE, supra note 5, at 152 n.51.
116. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). President Truman
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this extra constitutional notion of executive power. 17 Neither the
constitutional allocation of "Commander-in-Chief" powers or the au-
thority as the nation's Executive justified this exercise of power. 81
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's role during the Vietnam War
was primarily confined to its routine of refusing to review lower court
decisions concerning war powers issues. Interestingly, this ignored
historical precedent in which the Court had ruled on the nature of the
war powers."19
In contrast to the Supreme Court, lower courts during this pe-
riod began to show increased willingness to scrutinize the actions of
the executive and legislative branches. 120 Further, a predominant
theme of many of the cases toward the end of the Vietnam War was
that it was appropriate for courts to decide such cases when a direct
conflict existed between the two political branches. 2 1
The first significant glimpse of judicial willingness to intervene in
such a conflict occurred when a district court upheld a congressional
plaintiff's challenge to the President's war-making authority in
Holtman v. Schlesinger. 122 Although short-lived because of a later re-
was concerned that a threatened labor strike would jeopardize the ongoing war effort in Korea.
Therefore, he ordered the seizure of the nation's steel mills without congressional authoriza-
tion. Id.
117. Id. at 637.
118. It is fairly clear from the Youngstown opinion that the Justices agreed that Congress
could properly have authorized the seizure of the steel mills. In fact, emphasis was given to
the fact that Congress had previously withheld this kind of power for resolving industrial
disputes from the executive prior to this. Id. at 602.
119. F. WORMUTH & E. FIRMAGE, supra note 97, at 240. The authors give such examples
as Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 40 (1800), and Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 177 (1804)
where the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had the power to authorize hostilities without
declaring general war. Id.
120. In Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971), the
court stated the following:
The constitutional delegation of the war-declaring power to the Congress contains a
discoverable and manageable standard imposing on the Congress a duty of mutual
participation in the prosecution of war. Judicial scrutiny of that duty, therefore, is not
foreclosed by the political question doctrine ....
Id. at 1042 (emphasis added).
121. Judge Coffin in Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971), commented that:
The war in Vietnam is a product of the jointly supportive actions of the two branches
to whom the congeries of the war powers have been committed. Because the
branches are not in opposition, there is no necessity of determining boundaries.
Should either branch be opposed to the continuance of hostilities, however, and pres-
ent the issue in clear terms, a court might well take a different view.
Id. at 34. See also, F. WORMUTH & E. FIRMAGE, supra note 97, at 242-43.
122. 361 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d. Cir. 1973).
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versal,' 23 the court's opinion was a far cry from the dismissals predi-
cated on the much-maligned political question doctrine which were
common throughout the major portion of the Vietnam War era."
124
The Holtman suit was instigated by Congresswoman Elizabeth
Holtman and various Air Force officers who sought "a determination
that the President of the United States and the military personnel
under his direction and control may not engage in intensive combat
operations in Cambodia ... in the absence of Congressional authori-
zation required under Article I, Section 8, Clause 11, of the Constitu-
tion."'' 25 District Court Judge Judd rejected both defense objections
that Congresswoman Holtman lacked standing and that the case in-
volved a nonjusticiable political question. 1 26 On appeal, the circuit
court reversed Judge Judd. To understand the appellate court's rever-
sal, it is important to note that the suit was brought during the final
stages of the war. Thus, as a practical matter, the circuit court was
most likely cognizant of the difference "between the relative ease of
initiating war and the difficulty of ending it,"127 and therefore might
have hesitated to disrupt ongoing accommodations and negotiations
between the two political branches for expediting and end to the
war. 128
Another notable effort by individual congressional members to
challenge the executive's war-making authority came in the case of
Crockett v. Reagan. 29 Crockett is particularly pertinent because it en-
tailed an attempt to obtain judicial enforcement of the War Powers
Resolution. In Crockett, Congressman George Crockett and twenty-
eight congressional colleagues challenged President Reagan's failure
to comply with the "reporting" and "termination"' 130 requirements of
the War Powers Resolution following United States military involve-
123. The appellate court reversed the lower court based on its determination that the ques-
tion of the legality of bombing in Cambodia subsequent to removal of American forces was a
non-justiciable political question. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1308-13 (2d
Cir. 1973).
124. See, e.g., Mottola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'g 318 F. Supp. 538
(N.D. Cal. 1970); Pietsch v. President of the United States, 434 F.2d 861 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971); Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), aff'g, 287 F.
Supp. 846 (D.Kan. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970); Campen v. Nixon, 56 F.R.D. 404
(N.D. Cal. 1972).
125. Holtzman, 361 F. Supp. at 554.
126. Id.
127. F. WORMUTH & E. FIRMAGE, supra note 97, at 244.
128. Id.
129. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd per curiam, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
130. 558 F. Supp. at 893.
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ment in El Salvador. The plaintiffs contended that the President had
dispatched at least fifty-six members of the United States armed forces
to El Salvador and also provided monetary aid and military equip-
ment to support the Junta.
13 1
Because these "military advisers" were in combat zones, had
been subjected to at least two direct attacks, had suffered casualties
while fighting beside government troops, and had been designated for
a short while to receive "hostile fire pay,"' 1 2 their continuing presence
and involvement constituted "the introduction of Armed Forces into
hostilities or imminent hostilities"'' 3 3 thereby triggering the Resolu-
tion's sixty-day cut-off provision. 134 As their remedy, plaintiffs
wanted a declaratory judgment that the sixty-day provision had been
triggered and/or an injunction directing the defendants to immedi-
ately withdraw all military aid including the armed forces from El
Salvador. 
35
In countering this complaint, the defendants moved for dismissal
based upon the following four separate grounds. First, that the com-
plaint presented a nonjusticiable political question; second, the plain-
tiffs did not have standing; third, the court should utilize its equitable
discretion and dismiss the case; and, fourth, that the statutory provi-
sions invoked by plaintiffs provided no private right of action.1
36
The district court agreed with the defendants and concluded that
the necessary fact-finding to determine whether United States military
forces had been introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities ren-
dered the case "nonjusticiable.' 3 7 Therefore, even though the court
accepted the plaintiffs' allegations as true for the purposes of ruling on
the defendants' motion to dismiss, it granted the motion and avoided
the merits of the case.
Although the court characterized the instant case as being one
131. Id. at 895.
132. Id. at 897. See also, Wash. Post, July 30, 1982, at A24. The Comptroller General's
report stated that the Pentagon initially designated El Salvador as a "hostile fire zone." Appli-
cability of Certain United States Laws That Pertain to US. Military Involvement in El Salvador,
General Accounting Office, Report by the Comptroller General, GAO ID-82-53 (1982). This
designation was later revoked "for policy reasons" which were presumably executed to avoid
reporting to Congress under the War Powers Resolution.
133. War Powers Resolution of 1973, § 4(a)(l), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1973).
134. Id.
135. Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893, 896 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'dper curiam, 720 F.2d
1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 898.
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where there is a "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolution,"'' 38 it also affirmed the appropriateness of judi-
cial review over questions of apportionment of power between the two
political branches.139 In fact, the court disagreed with the defendants'
contention that the judicial branch should never hear such a case
since it would interfere with executive discretion in foreign affairs. t4°
The reasoning behind such a position was the court's distinction
that the plaintiffs were not seeking "relief that would dictate foreign
policy but rather to enforce existing law concerning the procedure for
decision-making."'1'4 Yet, the court deferred the matter to the polit-
ical forum in dismissing the suit under the political question doc-
trine. 42 The impression given is that the court believed a remedy
could still be fashioned in as much as Congress could still enact cer-
tain legislation that would curtail the executive's excesses.'
43
In its analysis, the court contrasted the instant case with the
Vietnam War which was the historical backdrop and catalyst for the
passage of the War Powers Resolution.'" The court acknowledged
that military involvement by the United States in Vietnam which
spanned seven years at the cost of more than 50,000 American lives
was a situation where it would be "absurd to decline to find that
United States forces had been introduced into hostilities" 45 and deny
application of the War Powers Resolution. According to the court,
however, the facts of Vietnam were "less elusive" than the case it had
before it.146 The problem with such an analogy is that it unduly re-
stricts the War Powers Resolution to only a Vietnam-like situation.
This would still allow short-term military deployments without con-
138. Id.
139. Id. In the court's words, it is not only appropriate but "[t]he duty of courts to decide
such questions ...[and this] has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Supreme Court." Id.
(emphasis added). See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
140. Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 898.
141. Id. (emphasis added)
142. This court followed the holding of Riegle v. Fed. Open Market Comm., 656 F.2d 873
(D.C. Cir. 1981) and the doctrine of equitable discretion for congressional plaintiffs. Crockett,
558 F. Supp. at 902.
143. Id.
144. The Crockett court stated that the case before it involved "subtleties of factfinding" in
contrast to Vietnam and was unable to make a determination of whether United States military
forces had been introduced into hostilities or imminent hostilities in El Salvador. Id. at 899.
145. Id. at 898-99.
146. Id. at 898.
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gressional authorization. 147
A recent example of this was the military deployment and reflag-
ging of Kuwaiti ships in the Persian Gulf. 148 This furor of events led
to a suit filed in federal district court seeking to force President Rea-
gan to abide by the War Powers Resolution by filing a report as re-
quired by section 4(a)( 1).149 The court refused to retain jurisdiction
and dismissed the suit based on the political question doctrine.
15 0
VI. PROPOSAL
Unfortunately, the War Powers Resolution has not resolved the
147. In Senator Javits' words:
The approach taken in the War Powers Bill reverses the situation by placing the
burden on the Executive to come to Congress for specific authority. The sponsors of
the Bill believe that this provision [the sixty-day automatic cutoff] will provide an
important national safeguard against creeping involvement in future Vietnam style
wars.
Foreign Relations Committee on War Powers Act, Feb. 9, 1972, 119 CONG. REC. 1400 (1973).
148. L.A. Times, Oct. 26, 1987, at 10; Senate Keeps Alive Debate on War Powers, Daily J.,
Oct. 12, 1987, at 3, col. 1.
149. This effort was led by Rep. Mike Lowry (D-Wash.) in which three Senators and 110
members of the House of Representatives filed suit in United States district court on August 7,
1987. The congressional plaintiffs were seeking declaratory relief that would require the Presi-
dent to file reports under the War Powers Resolution. Plaintiffs contended that the reporting
requirement of section 4(a)(1) "was triggered by the July 22, 1987 initiation of United States
escort operations in the Persian Gulf and by the September 21, 1987 attack on an Iranian Navy
ship laying mines in the Persian Gulf." Lowry v. Reagan, No. 87-2196 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1987)
(memorandum opinion of Judge George Revercomb). In his twenty-page opinion, Judge
Revercomb declined jurisdiction to enforce the resolution "because of the constraints of the
equitable discretion and political question doctrines." Id. at 20. This court distinguished the
instant case from Crockett in that the Persian Gulf was deemed more "volatile and more criti-
cal to U.S. economic interests than the situation in El Salvador." Id. at 18. Further, Congress
had debated and voted on the Persian Gulf situation while taking no action with regards to El
Salvador.
The final points of Judge Revercomb's analysis regarded the existence of hostilities. The
court noted that the resolution lacked a definitional section as well as any fixed legal standard
for determining whether hostilities existed. Combined with the lack of fact-finding resources
and the President's need for flexibility, the court concluded that the case did not contain judi-
cially manageable standards. Id. at 19. This case is currently being appealed.
150. It is readily admitted that the resolution has not facilitated more cooperation between
the executive and legislative branches. If anything, it has always been a point of friction when-
ever United States military forces have come under hostile fire. Every President since Nixon
has attempted to skirt the applicability of the resolution when filing reports that are "consis-
tent with" the law without actually recognizing it. L.A. Times, Oct. 26, 1987, at 10. Because
of this, Rep. Howard Berman filed an amicus curiae brief in the Lowry v. Reagan suit that
asked Judge Revercomb to declare the reports that President Reagan submitted as section
4(a)(1) reports. See Lowry v. Reagan, No. 87-2196 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 7, 1987) (Amicus Cu-
riae Brief filed Nov. 9, 1987, at 4). In any case, the alternatives are to repeal the resolution or
amend it in the hope of making it more operable. At this time, I have selected the latter
alternative as feasible.
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constitutional crisis that currently exists in the war powers arena. On
the other hand, the resolution remains a potentially useful and viable
concept.1 51 Therefore, in order to increase its effectiveness and appli-
cability, it requires two related alterations. First, the resolution must
be amended by Congress in order to make it more difficult for the
executive branch to ignore or circumvent its application. Second, the
judicial branch must be more willing to hear War Powers Resolution
claims. Since judicial restraint remains prevalent in the war powers
sphere,1 52 Congress can facilitate judicial review by providing the
courts with the necessary legal standards to enforce the War Powers
Resolution. 153
In order to vitiate various concerns which have been articulated
by several courts, Congress should amend the resolution. First, a defi-
nitional section needs to be added to correct the constructional weak-
nesses that courts have identified. 154 Congress must define
"hostilities" and "imminent hostilities." A proposed definition of
"hostilities" would be: when United States military forces have initi-
ated or participated in an exchange of munitions (whether by air
strike, naval shelling or ground forces) or otherwise used military
weapons. Any armed force which is designated to receive "hostile-
fire" pay will conclusively be presumed to be in an area of hostility.
"Imminent hostilities" could be defined as: any time in which a
United States military force prepares to engage in combat activity.
Combat activity would include flying over enemy territory, the use of
military advisers in foreign countries engaged in civil war, and provid-
ing military escort using live ammunition (including but not limited
to reflagging operations and evacuations).
The second major alteration deals with the resolution's reporting
provision. The reporting provision would need to be linked up with
the definitional section so that once a situation matches up with the
terms, the section 4(a)(1) mechanism is triggered. The President
151. See supra note 149.
152. See supra note 149, at 19.
153. While one might expect a commonsense understanding of such terms, they have been
a major stumbling block to invocation of the resolution. See supra note 149 (Does anybody
really question whether U.S. military forces are in an area of "hostility" after May 17, 1987
when 37 U.S. seamen were killed as the result of an Iraqi missile attack on the frigate Stark?
See Senate Keeps Debate Alive on War Powers, supra note 148, at 3, col. 1.).
154. As this resolution has already survived the political hurdles of bicameralism and pre-
sentment, the mechanism is in place until triggered. INS v. Chadha, 461 U.S. 919 (1983), is
only a factor in situations where affirmative action is necessary. Then the political process is
safeguarded by the provisions of bicamerality and presentment.
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would be required to submit a report which expressly indicates that it
is being issued "in compliance with section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers
Resolution" to avoid any ambiguity. Also, legislative history must be
incorporated in the Policy and Purpose Section to confirm that the
legislative intent was to establish the principle that inaction on Con-
gress' part is to have operational effect. In other words, a concurrent
resolution is not necessary for invocation of section 4(a)(1).155 If a
President fails to comply or believes the situation does not fall within
the purview of the War Powers Resolution, members of Congress
would be vested with a private right of action to challenge the execu-
tive's understanding of the situation. This would eliminate the prob-
lem of standing. The judicial hearing would be expedited to occur
within one week and a special court could be established for hearing
this matter. 
156
The primary remedy would be a declaratory relief action requir-
ing the President to file a 4(a)(1) report. The Court could not order
the withdrawal of military troops unless it finds the President has
failed to comply with the War Powers Resolution and sixty days have
elapsed without congressional authorization extending the military
deployment.
VII. CONCLUSION
The view that the War Powers Resolution has restored the bal-
ance in the shared responsibilities of troop deployment between the
executive and legislative branches seems refuted by the Grenada and
current Persian Gulf situations. It is clear that various Presidents
have taken unconstitutional liberties and engaged in illegal acts of
war-making authority. On the other hand, Congress shares the blame
for being unconstitutionally generous in allowing such acts to con-
tinue unchallenged. In this modem era we call "the nuclear age," it is
more critical than ever that Congress assume its constitutional role of
controlling the war powers.
While litigation by congressional plaintiffs may not be the ulti-
155. Alternatively, the District of Columbia Appeals Court could be the proper tribunal
with the Supreme Court fulfilling its normal function of review.
156. The allocation of the war power to Congress is a strong indication that the framers
envisioned deliberation and debate before engaging in war. While some might argue such a
notion is antiquated in this nuclear age, there are others who argue the exact opposite in that it
is precisely because of the possible consequences of extinction and survival that counsels for a
collective conscience over an individual one. See F. WORMUTH & E. FIRMAGE, supra note 97,
at 267-77.
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mate solution, the courts must recognize the distinction between in-
tervention in foreign policy making and enforcing decision making
within the foreign policy area. Such judicial enforcement would not
foreclose suits by congressional plaintiffs based on standing and the
political question doctrines. In any case, even if the proposed amend-
ments were implemented, unless there is steadfast congressional insis-
tence that the resolution be factored into every foreign policy
formulation that involves military action, the resolution will remain a
dormant relic and the executive branch will continue to run rough-
shod over Congress in the war powers domain.
Kenneth L. Heisz

